This study investigates three hypotheses: 1) the timing of the executive stock option grant dates, 2) the timing of the news around those dates, and 3) whether the option grant dates are backdated retroactively. These three hypotheses are examined simultaneously. The data come from the Amsterdam stock exchange. The empirical results provide evidence that that there are no significant abnormal cumulative returns in the period before the option grant date. However, we find significant abnormal cumulative returns during a period of 30 trading days after the option grant date, even for scheduled options granted before September 1, 2002. In addition, we have formed four different sub-samples: scheduled and unscheduled option grants, and, accounting for a change of the rulings as of September 1 st , 2002 options granted before and after the latter date. Significant differences in the means of abnormal returns of the various sub samples are observed. These disappear for scheduled option grants after September 2002, but not for unscheduled option grants. The regression estimates for the periods before and after the introduction of stricter rulings in 2002 are consistent with our findings from the t-tests. The regressions run provide not only evidence that the option grants are timed, but also that the option grants are retroactively backdated. In addition, our findings show that earnings news releases around option grant dates are managed. Our findings are consistent with timing of news being a substitute for backdating and timing of the option grant date. Although after September 2002 stricter rulings regarding the option grant date reduce the opportunities to exploit private information, they do not disappear completely, notwithstanding the requirement of immediately publishing the option grants.
Introduction
According to economic theory stock options align the interests of managers with those of outside shareholders. By means of stock options the managers' wealth is made dependent on a firm's share price. Managers can increase their wealth by exerting effort so that the share price increases. However, wealth can also be increased by influencing the conditions with regard to the contract of the stock option grants. By doing so, a manager's wealth will increase without performing any efforts for a firm's outside shareholders.
This study investigates abnormal returns around the option grant dates on the Netherlands´ stock market. We focus not only on the cumulative stock returns in the weeks around the option grant dates, but also on the relation between the number of options granted and the difference between the highest annual stock price and the strike price of the options granted, the so-called wealth effect of the option grants. The former analysis examines the short term effects of option grants which can be explained by the timing of the option grant dates. The latter analysis (examining the wealth effect) could provide evidence for retroactively backdating the option grants.
The contribution to the literature is that we examine option grants for the same data set taking into account three phenomena at a time: 1) the timing of the date of the option grant, 2) the timing of the news around the option grant date, and 3) the retroactively backdating of the option grant date. We account explicitly for scheduled and unscheduled option grants. Due to the change in legislation as of , we are also able to examine to which extent the introduction of stricter rulings affects the abnormal returns of option grants. Furthermore, by using a newly constructed variable accounting for the difference between the highest annual stock price and the strike price of the option granted we examine not only the annual wealth effect of the latter change of the rulings on scheduled and unscheduled option grants, but also the outcome provides evidence for retroactively backdating the option grants. Finally, we examine the extent to which earnings news releases around option grant dates are managed.
The remainder of this study is as follows. In section 2 prior literature is presented. The literature reports a number of arguments for adopting option grants, on the one hand, and explanations for the phenomenon of abnormal returns around the date of option grants, on the other. The data, sample and research method are discussed in section 3. Section 4 contains the empirical results and section 5 concludes.
Prior Literature
In this section we present three hypotheses regarding abnormal returns around the date of option grants. Previous studies on stock options document that employee stock options can be used in several ways: 1) as incentives (for instance, Smith and Watts, 1992) , 2) as substitute for corporate governance mechanisms (Beatty and Zajac, 1994; Baker and Gompers, 2003) , 3) to retain employees (Oyer, 2004; Roosenboom and Van der Goot, 2006) , and 4) when a firm has cash constraints (Core and Guay, 2001; Oyer and Schaefer, 2005 ).
An increasing number of studies examine the abnormal returns around the option grant date of executive stock option grants, for instance Heron and Lie (2006) , Lie (2005) , Chauvin and Shenoy (2001) , Aboody and Kasznik (2000) and Yermack (1997) , and Bebchuk, Grinstein and Peyer (2007) .
Yermack (1997) documents that the abnormal returns of scheduled options disappear, when options are granted at a fixed date each year because of the difficulties to influence the timing of scheduled option grants. Aboody and Kasznik (2000) and Chauvin and Shenoy (2001) investigate the abnormal return pattern around option grants for scheduled options, too. The authors find that there is a significant difference between the share price movements in the preand post-option grants period. According to Aboody and Kasznik (2000) , the abnormal returns preceding a scheduled option grant are insignificantly negative. Chauvin and Shenoy (2001) , however, find a significant abnormal decrease in the share price during ten days before the grant until the grant date. The difference in results could be explained by the sample period (Lie, 2005) . Where Chauvin and Shenoy (2001) use observations in the period 1981 -1992 , Aboody and Kasznik (2000 use the period 1992-1996. The abnormal returns that Aboody and Kasznik find after the option grant are significantly positive (Aboody and Kasznik, 2000) . Lie (2005) reports that the abnormal returns around option grants are significantly negative before option grants and significantly positive thereafter. The latter author posits that the ability of executives to predict future price movement based on inside information would be too good to be true. Therefore, he assumes that with the benefit of hindsight managers are selecting a date when the stock price is abnormally low, called backdating. Lie (2005) Three hypotheses emerge from these articles. The first hypothesis refers to the opportunistic timing of the option grant dates: options are granted when the stock price is relatively low (Yermack, 1997) . Second, the timing of information argument suggests that given a specific grant date, the flow of information to the market is managed to lower the stock price before the option grant (Aboody and Kasznik, 2000; Chauvin and Shenoy, 2001) . Third, the so-called backdating theory (Bebchuk, Grinstein and Peyer, 2007; Chourou, Abaoub, and Saadi, 2007; Heron and Lie, 2006; Lie, 2005) posits that the option grants are backdated retroactively by selecting a date when with the benefit of hindsight the stock price was at or near its annual lowest price. Obviously, if the options are granted at this price, the recipients´ increase in wealth is not related to their efforts performed.
Data, Sample and Method description
Our sample consists of all firms that are listed on the Amsterdam stock exchange which have granted options (once or more times) during the six years encompassing the period 1999-2004.
The data is from three sources: 1) financial statement information and stock prices come from DataStream, 2) data on the option grants, such as the number of options awarded to top managers, the exercise price of the options etc. are hand-collected from the annual reports, and 3) similar data on option grants are from September 1, 2002 available on the website of the Autoriteit Financiële Markten (www.afm.nl), the supervisor of the Netherlands capital market.
In general, the exercise price of the option is the price of the underlying stock on the date the options were granted. In a small number of cases the exercise price was determined above the market price. The option grants are considered to be scheduled when the date of the option grants was mentioned or when the options were granted each year around the same date (plus or minus three days). Top managers are required to report details of the transaction, such as the date of the option grant, the number of options, and the name of the recipient. Under the new rulings after September 1, 2002 option grants to top managers of firms listed on the Amsterdam stock exchange have to be reported immediately to the AFM. The regulatory change refers to a loophole under the old rulings. The new rulings have closed this loophole that freed top managers from reporting their transactions to the AFM when these were executed for them by so-called independent fund managers. When the date of the option grants was not reported in the annual report, the date was inferred by selecting the date of the share price in that specific year that was equal to the exercise price of the option.
As a check on the option grants date, the online register of the AFM is used. Before September 1, 2002 the majority of the option grants dates were disclosed almost solely in the annual report. Also, we found that some option grant dates were reported to the AFM, but not disclosed in the annual report. In addition to option grants published by the annual reports, those published on the AFM´s website, but not by the annual reports are classified as scheduled option grants. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
If the option grants are randomly distributed during a year, there should be no difference in means between the abnormal returns before and after . First, to test for abnormal returns before and after the stock option grant date we have compared the means of the cumulative stock returns of the firm with those of the appropriate market index, the Small and Local Market, the MidCap Market, and the AEX Market, respectively. T-tests are used to examine the extent to which the differences in means of the firm's stock returns and the appropriate market index are equal. The null hypothesis is:
where mean(CRFirm i,t ) is the mean of the cumulative stock returns of the firm i (i = 1, 2, … n) during period t, and mean(CRIndex j,t ) is the mean of the cumulative returns of the corresponding market type j (j = 1, 2, 3) during the same period. On the date of the option grants t equals 0. The test is performed for several intervals around the option grant date (t = -8 30 to -10, t = -30 to 0, t = -20 to 0, t = -10 to 0, t = 0 to 10, 0 to 20, 0 to 30, and t = 10 to 30). where mean (CAR i,v ) is the cumulative abnormal returns of firm i during period v before the date of the option grants and mean(CAR i,w ) that of the corresponding period w after the option grants date. Under the null-hypothesis we assume that the cumulative abnormal returns before the option grant are equal to those after the option grants.
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE Figure 2 shows the cumulative abnormal returns during 30 trading days before until 30 trading days after the date of the option grants. In the next section the empirical results for the t-tests will be presented. See table 2 for descriptive statistics of CRFirm, CRIndex, and CAR.
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
In addition to comparing the differences in the means of the cumulative returns we have conducted a number of regressions with the number of option grants as dependent variable for different model specifications. Each model contains four control variables. These are 1) a firm's market value to capture a possible size effect, 2) its return on assets and 3) profit growth to account for the incentive effect of option grants, and 4) a firm's debt scaled by the book value of its equity to account for a firm's capital structure.
In addition, there are three other variables that explain the variance of the options granted in a specific fiscal year. First, we have constructed a variable that is the difference of a firm's highest stock price during a particular fiscal year and the exercise price of the options granted divided by the options' strike price. A lower yearly minimum price and, hence, a lower exercise price of the option grants increases the wealth of the recipient of the options. For a number of observations we were not able to determine the date of the option grants exactly. In particular for these grants this variable captures the wealth effect on an annual basis of options that is not fully captured by the cumulative returns around the date of the unscheduled option grants.
Second, we use a dummy which has a value of one for options granted before , otherwise its value equals zero. Before the latter the rulings regarding the publishing of option grants were less strict than thereafter. The third variable is a dummy indicating whether the option grants are scheduled or not. Its value is one when the date of the option grants could be determined with the help of the annual report or of the AFM's website, otherwise zero. The regressions run are presented in tables 9 and 10.
Empirical results
In this section the empirical results for the t-tests, regressions and news releases will be presented. Table 3 Again, before the date of the option grant the firms' cumulative returns are smaller than those of the appropriate market index. In general, after the date of the option grant the firms' cumulative returns are higher than those of the corresponding market index.
Cumulative Stock Returns
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE Table 5 panel B demonstrates that the differences in means of the unscheduled option grants awarded before September 1, 2002 are never significant. An explanation could be that the date of the unscheduled option grants of the period could not exactly be determined. Table 5 panels C and D present t-tests of option grants awarded after September 1, 2002. As can be seen, in table 5 panel C only one t-test is significant, namely that of the period of 10 to 30 trading days after the option grants. In panel D of table 5 all t-tests concerning the period after the date of the option grants are significant. Furthermore, the differences in means are much bigger than those of panel C.
Cumulative Abnormal Stock Returns
To further examine the stock returns around the date of the option grants we have compared the means of the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) before the date of the option grants with those of the corresponding period after that date. The CARs are the firm's cumulative returns during a specific period adjusted for the corresponding market index return. As can be seen in Before the option grants date the CARs of table 8 panels A and B are higher than those after the option grant date.
As can be seen in table 8 panel C, for the period after September 1, 2002 the t-tests are never significant, which is in line with the stricter rulings of the AFM. However, regarding the unscheduled option grants in table 8 panel D two t-tests are significant. Obviously, the 37 firms that have not reported their option grants to the AFM do not apply with its rulings.
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE

Regressions on the Number of Options Granted
As can be seen in all models of table 9, bigger firms measured by their market value grant more options. Also, option grants per member of a firm's board are a decreasing function of a firm's return on assets. This outcome is consistent with option grants being a substitute for a bonus that is earned when a firm fares well. When a high bonus is awarded, the number of options that is granted to a member of the board is decreasing. Furthermore, the number of option grants is an increasing function of the growth of a firm's net profit and a decreasing function of its capital structure measured by a firm's debt to equity ratio.
In model 1 of table 9 the dummy indicating whether the option grants are scheduled is not significant. The dummy indicating if the options were granted before or after September 1,  2002 is significant and negative: before the last date the number of option grants is smaller than after that date. 
INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE
Earnings news releases around Option Grant Dates
In addition to the tests aforementioned, we have examined the extent to which the flow of information to the market around option grant dates was timed. Therefore, we have handcollected earnings news announcements from six weeks before to six weeks after the option grant dates. Table 11 presents logistic regressions of both good and bad news on a dummy indicating whether the earnings news was published before or after the option grant. As can be seen in all model specifications of table 11, bad news is significantly released before the option grant date, whereas the empirical results provide evidence that good news is released after the option grant date. After , the coefficients in model 3 of table 11 for good and bad news, respectively, are both larger than in model 2 of table 11. The outcome is consistent with the timing of earnings news being used for receiving option grants at a lower price.
Similarly, because in model 4 of table 11 the coefficients are greater than those in model 5 of table 11 these findings provide evidence that news releases are more timed for scheduled than for unscheduled option grants. Hence, the timing of news can be seen as a substitute for the backdating and timing of the date of the option grant. Logistic regressions using all classes of news releases instead of very bad and very good news only provide qualitatively similar results (not reported).
INSERT TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE
In sum, our results are qualitatively similar to Aboody and Kasznik (2000) who find no significant abnormal returns before the option grant date and significant abnormal returns after the option grant date. Yermack (1997) also finds no significant returns before the option grant date and positive returns after the option grant date. Our study differs from Yermack (1997) in that this author finds that most positive abnormal returns occurred a few days after the option grant. In this study, the positive returns are apparent for a period of 20 or more days after the option grant.
Conclusions
From a theoretical point of view stock options help to bridge the gap between a firm's top managers and its outside shareholders by aligning their interests. Managers can maximize their own and shareholders' wealth by exerting effort so that their firm's share price increases.
However, another possibility to maximize their wealth is to influence the conditions of the contract of the stock option grants. In this way, a manager's wealth will increase by selecting an exercise price that is as low as possible. Obviously, in this situation there is no relation between a manager's efforts and the options granted.
This study focuses on five research questions for the same dataset. First, we examine abnormal returns before and after the option grant date. Second, we account for scheduled and unscheduled option grants. Third, due to the change in legislation as of September 1, 2002, we are able to examine whether the introduction of stricter rulings affects the abnormal returns of option grants. Fourth, by using a newly constructed variable measuring the wealth effect on an annual basis of the option grants we examine whether option grants are retroactively backdated.
And finally, we examine the extent to which earnings news releases around option grant dates are managed.
As can be seen in tables 3-5, the empirical results regarding the differences in means of the cumulative stock returns and the appropriate market index are dependent on the period selected, and on being scheduled or not. Under the less strict rulings before September 1, 2002 we find significant differences in means for cumulative abnormal returns after the option grants date for Additional analyses by means of regression estimates include the wealth effect on an annual basis of option grants. The wealth effect is captured by a variable indicating the difference between a firm's highest stock price during a particular year and the exercise price of the options granted. In particular, the latter variable captures the wealth affect of unscheduled option grants of which the precise date of the option grants is less accurate.
When controlling for a firm's market value, return on assets, profit growth, and capital structure, the regression estimates provide evidence that the wealth effect on a yearly basis is only significant during the years before September 2002. This is consistent with the stricter rulings of the AFM after September 1, 2002. Because after the latter date all option grants to members of the board of directors of listed firms must be reported immediately to the AFM, which publishes the option grants on its website, the opportunities for retroactively backdating of option grants have decreased significantly.
Compared to model 1 of table 10, model 2 shows that the coefficient of the wealth effect for unscheduled options is not only almost four times as large as in model 1, but also its significance is greater.
The empirical results provide evidence that, in particular, unscheduled option grants are used to exploit private information for selecting the lowest annual stock price and, hence, the exercise price of the option grants. After September 1, 2002 the wealth effect is never significant. In addition, after September 1, 2002 the number of unscheduled option grants has decreased substantially to 34 firms. However, the last number is still 23 percent of all observations after Finally, the empirical results provide evidence that earnings news announcements around option grant dates are managed: bad news is released before and good news after the option grant date. The various model specifications for news releases are consistent with the stricter rulings after : after the latter date the effect of good and bad news releases, respectively, increases, which is consistent with timing of news being a substitute for backdating and timing of the option grant date.
In sum, the empirical results provide evidence that tougher monitoring affects the cumulative returns around the option grant date and the number of options granted to members of a firm's board. Given the differences in means of the abnormal returns before and after , these differences are not only statistically, but also economically significant. Although stricter rulings regarding option grants after September 1, 2002 reduce the opportunities for exploiting private information, this does not disappear completely, notwithstanding the monitoring of the AFM, and its ability to enforce its rulings. Sales = a firm's net sales. Net Profit = the net profit before extraordinary items. Profit Growth = the Net Profit before extraordinary items of this year minus the Net Profit before extraordinary items of last year divided by the Net Profit before extraordinary items of last year. Return on Assets = a firm's Net Profit divided by the book value of its Total Assets. Employees = the number of employees in full time equivalents. Market Value = the market value of equity at the end of a firm's fiscal year. Total Assets = the book value of a firm's assets. Total Debt = the book value of a firm's total debt. Equity = the book value of a firm's equity. Debt / Equity = book value of the firm's debt divided by the book value of a firm's equity. Option Grants = number of options granted per member of the board of directors. Maximum -Strike Price = a firm's highest stock price in a specific year minus the strike price of the options granted in that year divided by their strike price. The table shows cumulative stock returns (CR Firm) and cumulative abnormal stock returns (CAR) of firms listed on one of the three sub-markets of the Amsterdam stock exchange during the years 1999-2004 that have awarded option grants during to their top managers in the indicated periods of time before or after the date of the option grants. In addition, the corresponding cumulative returns of the appropriate market index (CR Index) are presented.
CR Firm = cumulative stock returns of the firm. CR Index = cumulative returns of one of the three market indices used (AEX Market, MidCap Market, and Small and Local Market). The numbers represent the time intervals before or after the option grant date. For instance, CR Firm-30 to -10, CR Firm-30 to 0, CR Firm0 to 10, are the cumulative stock returns during the period of 30 trading days before the option grant date until 10 days before that date, the cumulative stock returns during the period of 30 trading days until the date of the option grants, and the cumulative stock returns during the period of 10 trading days after the option grant date, respectively. A similar explanation regarding the cumulative returns of the appropriate market index applies to CR Index. CAR = cumulative abnormal returns. The cumulative abnormal returns are calculated as the cumulative stock returns of a firm minus the cumulative returns of the appropriate market index during the same time interval. For instance, CAR0 to 20 is the cumulative abnormal return for the period beginning at the option grant date until 20 trading days after the option grant date. 
